Abstract. We examine the relative e ciency of four methods for nite eld representation in the context of elliptic curve cryptography ECC. We conclude that a set of elds called the Optimized Extension Fields OEFs give greater performance, even when used with a ne coordinates, when compared against the type of elds recommended in the emerging ECC standards. Although this performance advantage is only marginal and hence there is probably no need to change the current standards to allow OEF elds in standards compliant implementations.
Introduction
The e cient implementation of arithmetic in nite elds is crucial for the high performance of various cryptographic algorithms, such as those based on the diculty of the discrete logarithm problem in nite elds, elliptic curves or hyperelliptic curves. In all of these schemes the e ciency of the underlying nite eld operations is the dominant performance constraint, any e ort spent optimizing the eld operations is well spent. This has led a number of special choices of eld to be used, each with its own performance characteristics. Due to di erent engineering constraints such as processor type, memory requirements etc there is no correct answer to the question: Which eld should one use ?
In this paper we look in more detail at the choice of nite elds in the case of elliptic curve based systems. It is important when comparing one parameter choice against another that we use real world parameter choices and we look not only at the performance of the underlying eld arithmetic but also at the performance of the overall cryptographic protocols. This is important since some cryptographic algorithms do not make use of general arithmetic but only require careful optimization of crucial parts. This is particularly true of modular exponentiation based systems where it makes more sense to spend a lot of time optimizing the squaring operation as opposed to the general multiplication operation. A similar situation holds for elliptic curves where one needs to optimize the point doubling operation more than the general point addition operation.
In this paper we will concentrate on the choice of nite eld and not consider the use of special curves, such as the so-called Koblitz curves, which can provide performance advantages. Hence our conclusions will not be e ected by security considerations as long as the overwhelming majority of curves over the given elds are considered to be secure.
It is also important to compare like for like, for example if one system uses machine code for the main arithmetics whilst the one being compared against uses no machine code then the comparison is not really fare. In addition one should only compare algorithms using a single computer. Even comparisons on almost identical processors can lead to di erent conclusions. For example in elds of characteristic two arithmetic is often implemented via lookup tables, hence algorithms will behave di erently on two processors which are identical bar the fact that one has a faster access time for its cache. Also comparing two systems which are programmed by di erent people one could be comparing programming ability rather than actual performance.
Often these considerations are ignored since complexity theory tells us that implementation details should not matter and that it is the complexity of the algorithm itself which should determine the relative merits. But complexity arguments only hold in the limit, which may not be applicable at the problem size under consideration. For example when multiplying two i n tegers, complexity theory tells us that Fourier transform techniques or Karatsuba multiplication will work faster than school book multiplication, but when multiplying 200 bit numbers it is far more e cient in practice to use a school book multiplication algorithm.
Various other authors have compared implementation details for elliptic curve systems, but we w ould contend that such comparisons are to be taken with a pinch of salt. For example Bailary and Paar 5 compare their OEF based elliptic curve implementation against other peoples implementations of characteristic two elds of composite degrees. This is bad practice for a number of reasons. Firstly composite elds of characteristic two are not recommended for use in cryptographic standards a view which has been reinforced by recent w ork in 10 . Secondly the authors of 5 have a reason to prefer OEF elds since they are putting them forward as a replacement for standard implementations, although in our comparison we give independent veri cation of their conclusion that OEF elds o er signi cant advantages. Thirdly the comparison was performed on 64 bit archetectures, which although these are now common in high end workstations, are not likely to be common in the small devices which are the target for elliptic curve based systems. Our comparison on a 32 bit RISC system is likely to be more indicative since such processors, like the StrongArm, are likely to be used in a numb e r o f s u c h devices in the comming years.
In another another comparison in 9 the authors give a comparison between even characteristic elds and odd characteristic elds, the later being implemented using Barrett reduction. This is slightly awed since standards compliant elliptic curve systems in odd characteristic are more likely to be implemented over elds de ned by a Generalized Mersenne prime which provide di erent performance characteristics than general primes.
The main reason for our interest was to compare the new idea of OEF elds with the elds de ned by GM-primes which occur in the standards documents. Hence all our implementations were coded from scratch and shared many core subprocedures. A similar length of time was spent optimizing each implementation and so the relative di erences in performance should be indicative of completely optimized implementations. Although the resulting comparisons are not completely scienti c we do hope that they are on a better foundation than previous ones. Hence hopefully they can be used to make further commerical considerations as to which elds are to be preferred. We end this introduction with a caveat that our timings where performed on a 32 bit RISC processor namely one of the Sparc family. This is probably indicative o f other RISC type processors but for smaller processors used in Smart cards, mobile phones and set top boxes di erent conclusions may possibly arise.
The Choices for Fields
Currently there are a number of eld choices for elliptic curve systems that are mentioned in the literature. These can be divided into two classes: 2.1. Prime Fields. Fields of large prime characteristic, F p , are very popular since they can be e ciently implemented using techniques borrowed from other nite eld based cryptographic systems such as DSA and RSA. However using standard modular arithmetic is not very e cient since multi-precision remaindering operations are very expensive. Hence when used in elliptic curve systems there are various choices that are often made:
General Primes For general primes the most e cient implementation technique is almost always to use Montgomery Arithmetic, 15 . Although the authors of 9 use Barrett reduction the timing di erence between Montgomery arithmetic and Barrett reduction is usually comparable. Montgomery arithmetic uses a special representation to perform e cient arithmetic, the division and remaindering essentially being performed by bit shifting. We do not cover this arithmetic here since it is covered in a number of text books e.g. 7 and 14 .
Generalized Mersenne Primes Certain primes are highly suited for e cient reduction techniques, the most simple form of such primes being the Mersenne primes, which are primes of the form p = 2 k , 1. However the number of Mersenne primes of the correct size for cryptography i s limited. This has led a number of authors to propose generalizations on the Mersenne primes. In another direction Solinas 16 i n troduced the concept of Generalized Mersenne Primes GM-primes which are primes of the form p = f2 k where f is a polynomial of small degree and weight and k is a multiple of the computer word size.
The use of GM-primes has become popular due to the adoption of these primes in the recommend curves in standards from such bodies as ANSI 1 , NIST 2 , SECG 3 , and WAP 4 . As an example we take the following example, from Solinas' paper, ft = t 3 , t , 1 then we obtain the 192-bit prime p = 2 192 , 2 64 , 1 = f2 64 :
Reducing the result of a multi-precision multiplication is then a simple matter: After performing the multi-precision multiplication of two 192-bit integers we obtain a n umber of the form N = A 5 jjA 4 jjA 3 jjA 2 jjA 1 Characteristic Two In this case due to work described in 10 w e need to choose n to be prime. One chooses fx to be a trinomial or pentanomial for e ciency. In other words we c hoose either fx = x n + x k + 1 or fx = x n + x k + x l + x m + 1 :
These have been a popular choice in standards bodies and for implementors due to the advantages that they o er in hardware and on some RISC processors. The literature on these is quite extensive s o we just refer the reader to 7 or 13 for more details. For e ciency reasons it is often sensible to insist that ! = 2 .
In OEF elds addition of elements in F q is relatively simple and can be accomplished without carries propagating, since elements of F q are implemented as polynomials modulo fx. Multiplication is also very simple since reduction of a polynomial modulo fx is particular simple. Multiplication can also be simpli ed via using Karatsuba multiplication, which e v en provides a performance advantage for polynomial multiplication for very small degree polynomials. Finally inversion is particularly easy since one can use a technique due to Itoh and Tsujii 12 combined with an e cient method to compute the action of the Frobenius mapping, see 6 for more details on this.
It should be noted that the technique of Weil descent which is described in 10 could be applied to curves de ned over OEFs, since n is typcially small. However the resulting curve does not seem to have the nice properties that one observes in the even characteristic case. This is because the function eld extensions are not Artin-Schreier in nature. Hence to the best current knowledge there are no security concerns with using OEFs, however this could change given the rapid progress made in studying the EC-DLP in recent y ears.
There has been no comprehensive comparison of the above c hoices of nite elds in the literature. Since the use of Montgomery arithmetic and even characteristic nite elds are quite standard 9 these are not the most interesting cases. However the comparison of OEFs against GM-prime elds has not to our knowledge been carried out. But this is the most important comparison to make, since GM-prime elds are those which are being used by v arious standards bodies, e.g. ANSI, NIST and SECG.
In this paper we describe an independent e v aluation of the performance of the four types of nite eld mentioned above. The implementations we describe had a similar level of optimization applied to them, this is because, as mentioned previously, one cannot compare performance information across di erent processors or with di erent levels of optimization performed.
The implementation described was written in portable C++, with only a few lines of machine code. The target archetecture was assumed to have a 32-bit word length, the actual timings being implemented on a Sparc Ultra 5 Workstation with 64MB of RAM.
Field Operations
The elds we used for comparison where the following: 0:16s 12:96s 1:56ms 0:18ms Notice that the even characteristic case appears to be the worst since multiplication is almost twice as slow as the next slowest eld type, namely the Montgomery representation. This however does not translate into a 100 increase in the required CPU time for the nal cryptographic operation since for elds of even characteristic the squaring operation comes almost for free.
The use of multiplication is also slightly faster for the OEF eld compared to the GM-prime eld. But the most striking improvement is in the time required to perform an inversion in the eld. As we shall comment later, this leads to important decisions on how one actually implements an elliptic curve cryptographic system.
It is important to look at the ratio, r = I = M, of the time to perform an inversion, I, to the time to compute a multiplication, M, which in our examples comes out to be, r Mont = 2 3 :81; r GM,prime = 3 6 :49; r OEF = 3 :97; r F 2 191 = 1 3 :88 4 . Curve Operations
The basic elliptic curve operation required in cryptography is point m ultiplication. That is given P 2 EF q and k 2 R 1; : : : ; EF q , 1 compute k P. There are various techniques to perform this which are described in 7 and 14 .
A rst observation is that if P is a xed point which is required to be multiplied by a large number of values, k, then one can use a great deal of precomputation. Such a point, P, is often the generator of the group EF q and is hence called a base point. However sometimes we do not know the value of P in advance and so di erent optimizations need to be performed, in such a situation we call P a general point.
In standard implementations for the EC-DH protocol each party needs to perform one multiplication of a general point and one multiplication of the xed base point. In the EC-DSA protocol the signer needs to perform one multiplication of the base point and the veri er needs to perform a multiplication of the base point a n d a m ultiplication of a general point.
A second observation is that in both multiplication of a general point and of the base point can be done in either a ne or`mixed' coordinates.`Mixed' coordinates refers to the fact that we use a projective representation of the points, we, however, take i n to account that some of the intermediate points may be in a ne representation. Mixed coordinates are to be preferred when the ratio, r, of inversion to multiplication is large, since one is trading o inversions for a larger number of multiplications. On the other hand a ne coordinates require 33 less storage.
For our timings we used the following curves which are suitably strong for cryptographic use: EK 1 . We used the curve labelled P , 192 which is two times a prime. Here we have c hosen a curve with coe cient of X 2 equal to one, this gives greater performance in characteristic two. In addition for characteristic two elds the best type of group order we can use is one which is twice a prime. Hence this curve i s t ypical of ones used in real life systems, although NIST does not have a curve i n c haracteristic two at this level of security.
In the following table we see that for OEF elds we not only obtain a improvement when using a ne coordinates but we also obtain a small improvement o ver GM-prime elds when using mixed coordinates. We also reduce the amount of memory required for the tables in the window m ultiplication methods since we n o longer need to store the z-coordinates. We also notice that for general point m ultiplications the performance of curves over elds of even characteristic is not as bad as one would be led to believe from just looking at the timings for the eld arithmetic. In some small systems, to avoid attacks like D P A 11 one often alters the base point o n e v ery run of the protocol. Hence one never actually uses the special optimizations for multiplying a base point and all point m ultiplications become general ones.
Cryptographic Operations
Finally we timed three basic cryptographic operations which are popular using ECC namely unsigned Di e-Hellman EC-DH, the EC variant of the digital signature algorithm EC-DSA, and the EC variant of the MQV primitive MQV. The timings we give below for our four specimen elds. The times for EC-DH and EC-MQV are the times required by one of the parties to perform their calculations. In the following we assumed that any base point m ultiplication was done using the optimizations alluded to above. We have shown that OEF elds appear to o er performance advantages over other eld representations used in ECC. This is not only in terms of overall performance but also in terms of storage memory requirements. The present author has no vested interests in any of the four elds types under consideration and hopefully the results can be taken as completely independent of commercial bias or the use of agressive optimization techniques applied to one of the cases only.
On the other hand it should be noted that the performance di erence between OEF elds and elds based on Generalized Mersenne numbers is probably not large enough to warrant additions to the various standards since addition of OEF elds would degrade attempts to obtain interoperability between various implementations.
